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While much of the world is united against the Islamic 
State (ISIS), the international legal grounds by which 
countries justify striking ISIS targets in Syria are diverse, 
complicated, and controversial.1 To begin with, ISIS is 
considered a non-state actor under international law, 
which poses a legal hurdle for states that want to target it 
inside Syrian sovereign territory. Additionally, the United 
Nations Security Council – the international community’s 
authority on the use of force – responded to ISIS with a 
vaguely-worded resolution that falls short of authorizing 
military force in Syria. Finally, following the November 
2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France invoked article 
42.7 of the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty, a previously 
untested mutual assistance clause. The response from EU 
member states to the mutual assistance clause will set a 
precedent and have broader implications for the future of 
European common defense.
Germany entered this legal morass on December 4 
when the Bundestag voted to authorize military assis-
tance to the coalition striking ISIS targets in Syria. Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel’s government claimed collective 
self-defense, in conjunction with Article 42.7 of the Lisbon 
Treaty and UN Security Council Resolution 2249 (UNSCR 
2249), as the international legal bases for military action.2 
In doing so, Germany altered its traditionally cautious 
approach to jus ad bellum – the criteria a state must 
consult before engaging in international armed conflict 
– by broadly interpreting a UN Security Council resolu-
tion and adopting an expansive definition of self-defense 
under the UN Charter.
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When the German parliament authorized providing military assistance to the coalition 
striking ISIS targets in Syria in December 2015, the government stated that collec-
tive self-defense – in conjunction with Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty and multiple 
United Nations Security Council resolutions – provided the international legal basis for 
military action. In doing so, Germany altered its traditionally cautious approach to jus 
ad bellum by broadly interpreting UNSC resolutions and adopting an expansive defi-
nition of self-defense. Germany’s international legal jurisprudence is now more closely 
aligned with that of its larger military allies, like the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France. But what exactly does this mean for the foreign policy of a country that 
is steadily increasing its degree of involvement in international security affairs? This 
article argues that Germany’s new approach to jus ad bellum is in keeping with a 
country that seeks a more active role in international affairs.
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The decision to join the coalition against ISIS in Syria 
is yet another sign of Germany’s increasingly important 
role in the international community. But it also illustrates 
Germany’s new willingness to interpret international law 
in ways that correspond with its foreign policy objectives. 
This article highlights several aspects of Germany’s evolv-
ing approach to international law.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 
2249
Shortly after terrorists affiliated with ISIS killed 130 civil-
ians in Paris and many more in Lebanon and Turkey, the 
UN Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 2249. 
The operative portion of the resolution is located in para-
graph 5, in which the Council:
Calls upon Member States that have the capacity to do 
so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with 
international law, in particular with the United Na-
tions Charter, as well as international human rights, 
refugee, and humanitarian law, on the territory under 
the control of ISIL also known as Da’esh, in Syria and 
Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to pre-
vent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically 
by ISIL … and to eradicate the safe haven they have 
established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria;
In its letter to the UN Security Council, and at a press con-
ference following the Bundestag’s vote to authorize mili-
tary force, the Merkel government cited UNSCR 2249 as 
one basis for its use of force against ISIS in Syria.3 Under 
the UN Charter, a Security Council resolution authorizing 
military force is a legal basis for the use of force against 
another state, but not all resolutions specifically autho-
rize the use of military force.4 For the Security Council 
to sanction the use of force, it must first determine that 
there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an 
act of aggression.5 Then, acting under Article 42 of Chap-
ter VII, the Security Council can “decide” or “authorize” 
member states to use “all means necessary” to eradicate 
the threat.6
The UN Charter avoids prescribing the specific lan-
guage that the Security Council must use to authorize 
military force. Rather, the Security Council has devel-
oped, through practice, a set of terms that indicate its in-
tent to authorize military force.7 First, the phrase “acting 
under Chapter VII” is typically used to refer to the initial 
determination about a threat to peace, which the Secu-
rity Council must establish. Second, the Security Council 
commonly uses the verbs “decide” or “authorize” to signal 
to member states that military action is authorized.
When a proposed military operation is particularly 
contentious, like the one against ISIS in Syria, the 
resulting resolution can leave doubt about whether the 
Security Council is actually authorizing member states 
to use military force. UNSCR 2249 does not disappoint 
in terms of ambiguity. For one thing, it omits any lan-
guage referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This 
omission alone, however, does not render the resolution 
unenforceable, as the International Court of Justice has 
pointed out that resolutions passed outside of Chapter 
VII can be legally binding and authorize the use of force.8 
But UNSCR 2249 continues to deviate from the norma-
tive language authorizing the use of force when, instead 
of using the traditional verbs “decide” or “authorize,” it 
“calls upon Member States” to take all measures neces-
sary in compliance with the UN Charter and interna-
tional law.9 
UNSCR 2249 therefore falls short of providing a green 
light for states seeking a UN mandate to strike ISIS in 
Syria. Nevertheless, the United States, France, United 
Kingdom, and Germany all claimed the text provided 
them with the legal authority to use such force. Germa-
ny’s case is particularly interesting, as it has traditionally 
tread carefully in the Security Council’s murky waters. 
In 2002, when the Security Council passed Resolution 
1441 (UNSCR 1441) – which the US and UK used partly 
to justify the invasion of Iraq – the Germans claimed 
the resolution did not authorize military force.10 UNSCR 
1441 stated that the Council was “acting under Chapter 
VII” and warned of “serious consequences” if Iraq did 
not comply with the provisions concerning its weapons 
program.11 The ambiguity in the language of UNSCR 1441 
related to whether the phrase “serious consequences” 
conveyed the same authorization to use military force as 
“all means necessary,” and whether an additional Secu-
rity Council resolution was needed before states could 
use force.12 US President George Bush and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, much to the dismay of many in the 
international community, claimed UNSCR 1441 as a basis 
for the war. Gerhardt Schroeder, then the German chan-
cellor, took the opposing view, and stated shortly before 
the invasion that the resolution “contain[ed] nothing 
automatic as far as military force.”13 
Compared to the Schroeder government, Merkel’s 
coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
appears willing to interpret Security Council resolutions 
more broadly.14 In its letter to the Security Council, the 
German government wrote: “The Security Council has 
confirmed in its resolution 2249 … that ISIL ‘constitutes 
a global and unprecedented threat to international 
peace and security’ and has called upon Member States 
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to eradicate the safe haven that ISIL has established in 
significant parts of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.” 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier explained fur-
ther: “We thus consider that we are on firm legal ground, 
also in terms of international law, with the support we 
are providing for France.”15
Embracing UNSCR 2249 as a legal basis for military 
force signals a distinct shift in Germany’s approach to jus 
ad bellum. If one accepts the argument that UNSCR 2249 
does not authorize military force, then Germany and its 
allies would have to rely on collective self-defense as the 
legal basis for the use of force against ISIS in Syria. Prior 
to the military campaign in Syria, Germany only once 
provided significant military assets to an armed con-
flict without direct UN authorization: as part of NATO’s 
mission to avert genocide in Kosovo. In that case, Euro-
peans sought a Security Council resolution to intervene, 
but China and Russia initially opposed a resolution to 
establish a no-fly zone. Ultimately, NATO cast the conflict 
as a threat to European security, broadly interpreting 
its collective defense origins, and an extensive bombing 
campaign followed.16 Later, in June 1999 – months after 
the bombing began – the UN Security Council voted to 
allow it, and the operation gained a UN mandate.17
Germany’s interpretation of its commitment to NATO 
in Kosovo signaled a willingness to place its interests – in 
this case mutual defense alliances and preventing geno-
cide– above the politics of the UN Security Council. Simi-
larly, promoting UNSCR 2249 as a legal basis for the use 
of force against ISIS in Syria demonstrates a shift from 
the strict interpretation exercised during the Schroeder 
years to the current government’s foreign policy-based 
approach.
Collective Self-Defense against a Non-State 
Actor
In addition to Security Council resolutions, the UN Char-
ter allows member states to use force in self-defense 
or in collective self-defense, where one member state 
comes to the aid of another.18 In its letter to the Security 
Council, Germany also cited collective self-defense as a 
legal basis for using military force against ISIS in Syria: 
“Exercising the right of collective self-defense, Germany 
will now support the military measures of those States 
that have been subjected to attacks by ISIL.”19 
But deploying military forces against a non-state actor 
located in a sovereign state is controversial. It pits two 
fundamentals of international law, the right to self-de-
fense and state sovereignty, against each other. The UN 
Charter provides little guidance concerning what con-
stitutes an “attack” under international law, referring 
only to an “armed attack” against a state.20 Advocates 
of a strict interpretation of international law point out 
that the UN Charter is intended to regulate the actions 
of states, not non-state actors like the ISIS.21 Under this 
interpretation, a Security Council resolution is required 
to justify the use of force against ISIS in Syria. 
A practice among certain states, which has gained 
momentum since 9/11, is to use force against a non-state 
actor in another state when that state is “unwilling or 
unable” to prevent the non-state actor from attacking 
another state.22 Prominent examples of the “unwilling 
or unable” test include Colombia’s pursuit of the FARC in 
Ecuador (2008), Israeli air strikes against the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunisia (1985), 
and the United States’ drone strikes against Al Qaeda 
targets in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.23 The night 
raid by US Special Forces on Osama bin Laden’s com-
pound in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011 is perhaps 
the best-known example of this doctrine in practice. 
Despite the growing acceptance of this practice, many 
states – specifically those whose territory is attacked – 
view the unwilling or unable test as an unacceptable 
affront to territorial sovereignty. 
Application of the unwilling or unable test to Syria 
rests on Bashar al-Assad’s inability to prevent ISIS from 
striking targets abroad, for example in Paris or Brussels. 
In its letter to the UN Security Council, Germany wrote:
ISIL has occupied a certain part of Syrian territory 
over which the Government of the Syrian Arab Re-
public does not at this time exercise effective control. 
States that have been subjected to armed attack by 
ISIL originating in this part of Syrian territory are 
therefore justified under Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations to take necessary measures of 
self-defense, even without the consent of the Govern-
ment of the Syrian Arab Republic. 
The unwilling or unable test is new to Germany. In Af-
ghanistan, Germany came close to endorsing the practice 
when NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter on September 
12, 2001 and the Bundestag later voted to provide military 
assistance to the United States in its fight against Al Qa-
eda. But in that case, the Bundeswehr provided very lim-
ited support to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom 
and waited until the Security Council passed Resolution 
1386 (UNSCR 1386), creating the International Security 
Assistance Force, before committing a significant number 
of troops and resources. Even then, wary of endorsing the 
right to self-defense against a non-state actor, the Secu-
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rity Council resolution made only a brief reference to self-
defense in its preamble, choosing instead to characterize 
the operation as an international security operation.24 
While the unwilling or unable test remains contro-
versial, endorsing it does not set Germany apart from 
the international community. Rather, it aligns Germany 
with its NATO and European allies; embracing the test 
removes a substantial legal hurdle to pursuing terrorist 
organizations unaffiliated with any state. Furthermore, 
it is yet another sign that the German government is 
willing to take contentious positions in order to achieve 
its foreign policy directives.
Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty: The Mutual 
Assistance Clause
Following the attacks in Paris, there was much specula-
tion about whether French President François Hollande 
would invoke NATO’s Article 5.25 To some surprise, 
Hollande instead invoked article 42.7 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the European Union’s heretofore untested mutual 
defense or assistance clause, to galvanize support for 
the military campaign against ISIS in Syria.26 The text 
states:
“[I]f a Member State is the victim of armed aggression 
on its territory, the other Member States shall have 
towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all 
the means in their power, in accordance with Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not preju-
dice the specific charter of the security and defense 
policy of certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall 
be consistent with commitments under the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States 
which are members of it, remains the foundation of 
their collective defense and the forum for its imple-
mentation.”
Unlike the legal questions surrounding the use of force 
against a non-state actor and the ambiguous wording in 
UNSCR 2249, the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 42.7 presented 
an immediate political question: How would European 
countries respond to France’s call for help? The United 
Kingdom and Germany answered with votes in their re-
spective parliaments to authorize military support. Other 
EU member states offered varying degrees of military and 
non-military support. 
Political questions aside, does the European Union’s 
mutual assistance clause also serve as a legal basis for 
the use of force? In a press statement shortly after the 
Bundestag’s vote, Foreign Minister Steinmeier addressed 
the legality of military action by citing article 42.7 in 
conjunction with UNSCR 2249 and Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.27 Steinmeier’s statement appears to stop just 
short of characterizing the clause as a stand-alone basis 
for the use of force, but article 42.7 may serve another 
purpose. Collective self-defense under the UN Charter 
requires the state suffering an attack to affirmatively 
ask another for assistance.28 Only then is the non-victim 
state’s use of force legal under the UN Charter. Article 
42.7, like NATO’s Article 5, serves this function.
A more likely reason Germany is championing the 
Lisbon Treaty’s assistance clause is the message it sends 
to the European Union. Article 42.7 uses vague language 
concerning the type of assistance member states must 
provide, and effectively allows EU states to sit on the 
sidelines if their individual foreign policies dictate. A 
weak response from European states would hardly send 
a signal of unity at a time when European cohesion is 
fraying. Germany, perhaps more than any other Euro-
pean country, has called for a strong European common 
defense initiative. By citing it as a basis – or even a par-
tial basis – for force, Germany is promoting the military 
campaign against ISIS as a coherent European response.
Conclusion
The Bundestag’s vote to join the coalition fighting ISIS 
in Syria, coupled with the government’s official remarks 
on the legality of the use of force, reveal three develop-
ments in Germany’s approach to international law. First, 
Germany will not bind itself to a strict interpretation of 
UN Security Council resolutions if they stand in the way 
of its own foreign policy objectives. Second, Germany 
has endorsed a broad definition of collective self-defense 
against non-state actors that removes a legal hurdle for 
the Bundeswehr to become more active fighting terrorist 
organizations. Third, Germany seized an opportunity to 
promote a European front on defense by including Ar-
ticle 42.7 in its legal justification. Taken together, these 
three points reflect Germany’s willingness to depart in 
some ways from its historically cautious approach to 
foreign engagements. 
But do these developments signal an intent to in-
crease the Bundeswehr’s role in foreign military opera-
tions? Critics will point to Germany’s lackluster defense 
spending and its relatively modest contribution to the 
military campaign in Syria to argue that the country’s 
contribution to international security does not corre-
spond to its political weight in the international com-
munity. An indicator of whether the government is ready 
to put more skin in the game may come in a Defense 
White Book scheduled for release this summer. Certainly 
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this new approach to international law can be partly 
attributed to the nature of the threat ISIS poses, one 
that many Germans fear will eventually reach its cities. 
Regardless, the decision to join the coalition against ISIS 
in Syria is a break from tradition and one that may usher 
in a new era of German foreign policy.
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